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Resumo 
Neste projeto, o nosso objetivo é usar a técnica de teste de fuzzing, que fornece 
dados inválidos, inesperados ou aleatórios para a entrada de um programa para nele 
tentar encontrar vulnerabilidades. Os resultados do teste fornecem ao programador 
informações para melhorar o programa, nomedamente para torná-lo mais seguro. 
Um ambiente de computação em grade é usado para suportar o fuzzing das 
aplicações usando simultaneamente os recursos de vários computadores em uma 
rede, a fim de paralelizar o processo e permitir tentar muitas entradas diferentes. 
Um trabalho de fuzzing é dividido em várias tarefas de fuzzing e distribuído aos 
recursos de rede que se encontrem livres para que a operação seja realizada. Um 
broker recebe as solicitações de fuzzing de clientes, e insere a divisão de tarefas num 
servidor Web, como o Apache. Quando os recursos da rede estão disponíveis, as 
tarefas de difusão são descarregadas a partir do servidor web e automaticamente 
executadas e os resultados retornados ao serviço de coordenação. O serviço de 
coordenação Zookeeper é usado para sincronizar o broker, o servidor web e dos 
recursos. 
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Abstract 
In this project, our goal is to use a testing technique called fuzzing that provides 
invalid, unexpected or random data to the input fields of an application to find 
vulnerabilities in the same application. The testing results provide a programmer 
with information to improve the program, making it more secure.  A Grid 
computing environment was designed to support the fuzzing of applications, by 
using simultaneously the resources of many computers in a network, in order to 
parallelize the process and allow trying many different inputs. One fuzzing job is 
divided into many fuzzing tasks and distributed to the free network resources for 
fuzzing. A broker gets the fuzzing requests from clients, and then inserts the split 
fuzzing tasks into a Web server, like Apache. When resources in the network are 
available, fuzzing tasks will be downloaded from the web server and resources will 
automatically execute these tasks and return the results to ZooKeeper. The 
ZooKeeper coordination service is used for synchronizing the broker, the web server 
and the resources. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Software security, which is worth being paid much more attention to than ever 
before, is currently a serious problem around the world. As the growing reliance on 
internet services makes malicious intrusions more attractive, attacks on systems 
become more and more prominent. Examples are cross-site scripting (XSS) [15], SQL 
injection [30] and so on. Consequently, numerous innocent internet users have 
suffered tremendous losses from system failures or being trapped in attacker’s tricks, 
such as identity theft [47] and password leakage. If such trends continue and expand 
without any effective intervention, the problem will become worse in the future.  
 
Confronted with this situation, enterprises and governments expect more secure 
techniques which will help develop software in a more secured manner or of 
improved software security. Unfortunately, common software development practices 
inevitably leave software with vulnerabilities, because of the fact that most software 
developers focus more on function implementations, rather on vulnerability 
prevention [1]. Even in software that was carefully designed by considering security, 
vulnerabilities can always find places in those complicated-designed systems. As a 
result, what developers count on is to perform software testing [31-33] after the 
system is developed.  
 
Traditionally, testing software refers mainly to requirement-based function testing 
[34] to verify a specific action or function of the code, which is intended to answer 
“can user do this or that”. It can help to detect inconsistency and incompleteness in 
the system. On the contrary, in non-functional testing [35, 37] the objective is to test 
those requirements that do not relate with functionalities, concerning more on 
system security, performance, reliability, etc. Absence of non-functional testing 
buries invisible problems in the system, which eventually leads to system 
malfunction if some unexpected operation or ill-intended action is done. Digging out 
these problems in the system requires persons with adequate skills and tools.  
 
In this thesis, we will only focus on one aspect of non-functional testing—security 
testing [6, 7, 36]. For detecting and getting rid of vulnerabilities, security testing on 
software is considered as a good measure due to the following reasons. Firstly, no 
matter how well today´s systems have been developed, they are often complicated 
with huge volumes of code, complex internal interactions, interoperability with 
uncertain external components, unknown interdependencies coupled with vendor 
costs and schedule pressures, which means that exploitable flaws will always be 
present or surface over time. Thus security testing plays a crucial role in filling the 
gap between the state-of-the-art in system development and actual operation of 
these systems. Secondly, security testing is so important to understand, calibrate, and 
document the operational security posture of an organization, that it is an essential 
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component to improve the security of organizations. Therefore, organizations that 
have an organized, systematic, comprehensive, ongoing, and priority driven security 
testing regimen are in a much better position to make prudent investments to 
enhance the security of their systems. 
1.1 Problem statement 
To perform security testing of large applications, we consider the following scenarios: 
in companies or governments, they use software in many fields, such as providing 
services to the public. Generally, these companies or governments demand 
complicated software to satisfy their needs. As a result, software has to be designed, 
and developed in a complex manner. Due to this situation, software vulnerabilities 
inevitably exist, which might allow attacks on the system in the future. For 
eliminating these vulnerabilities and preventing giant losses suffered from attacks, 
they have to perform security testing on the system. Alternatively, they can send 
their application to security testing agencies for obtaining vulnerability details if they 
prefer to obviate the boring testing process or they do not have enough hardware 
resources or software support to perform security testing.  
 
Independent of the security testing being performed by software development 
companies or security testing agencies, they can not escape the difficult situation of 
local resource limitation if they plan to test software in a centralized manner. The 
problem becomes much more prominent for security testing agencies, because they 
have to promise to perform security testing in a short period at the request of their 
clients, while they receive too many security testing jobs from different enterprises 
or governments. Due to budget and space limitation for resources in a local 
environment (such as CPUs, memories, hard disks, etc.), they can not test software 
efficiently to satisfy all clients’ demands if given too many applications for security 
testing in a short period.  
1.2 Solution 
To address the problem of resource limitation, in this thesis we propose a grid 
computing environment for fuzzing, which uses free network resources to perform 
security testing. When performing a security test, one fuzzing job will be divided into 
many fuzzing tasks. We intend to use the fuzzing tool SPIKE [9] to help create fuzzing 
tasks. The grid computing environment distributes these fuzzing tasks to the remote 
resources which committed to perform security testing. For example, one fuzzing 
task fuzzes the field ‘Name’, one fuzzes “Contact”, and another fuzzing task takes 
charge of the field ‘Address’. The three fuzzing tasks are distributed in the network, 
and ideally remote resources can fuzz the three fields respectively at the same time. 
Thus fuzzing process can go on efficiently by reducing almost two-thirds of fuzzing 
time spent in a local fuzzing environment.  
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ZooKeeper is used to coordinate the fuzzing service of remote resources, from which 
they fetch fuzzing tasks referred by task znodes [12] in ZooKeeper. The broker 
publishes invitations on the website (e.g., a link directed to the fuzzing process).Once 
network resources agree to join the fuzzing process (e.g., clicking the invitation link), 
they will be automatically directed to download fuzzing tasks and execute them in 
the remote resources’ local environment. Execution results from remote resources 
are available in ZooKeeper’s task znodes, which will be taken away by the broker who 
is responsible for delivering details of vulnerabilities to companies or governments.  
 
By designing the fuzzing system in a distributed manner, thousands of remote 
resources can be invited to join the fuzzing service, eliminating inefficiency on the 
security testing. Besides all the functionalities introduced, we also consider achieving 
high availability and performance in the system by accomplishing some important 
attributes, such as preventing concurrence [60]. 
 
The outline of this thesis is arranged as follows. Some related work will be discussed 
in the following sections. In Chapter 2, we are going to represent some basic 
concepts in security, some attacks related with input validation, and techniques that 
will be implemented in the system. Then we introduce the development 
environment of this system. In Chapter 3, the system model will be presented. 
System components and their functionalities are explained in detail. Chapter 4 will 
provide more technical details about how the system is constructed. In Chapter 5, we 
intend to perform fuzzing testing on three programs, and some strategies will be 
presented to give hints on how to fuzz programs and improve programs with fuzzing 
results. At the end of the thesis, we make some conclusions and propose some 
interesting issues in the prototype of the grid fuzzing system.   
1.3 Related work 
Regarding the grid environment, we borrow the idea from a GRIDTS [5]. In GRIDTS, 
one job is divided into many tasks, and a tuple space is used for supporting task 
scheduling. Tasks to be executed are placed in the tuple space. The grid resources 
retrieve unexecuted tasks from the tuple space and execute them. Results are also 
placed in the tuple space, available for users. What mainly differentiates our grid 
fuzzing system from GRIDTS is that we use ZooKeeper to coordinate the service, 
rather than the tuple space. Also, we consider a specific usage for the grid fuzzing, 
while GRIDTS is a general purpose grid infrastructure. There are many other grid 
environments, such as Globus [29] and OurGrid [38], but they are not based on 
coordination services like a tuple space or ZooKeeper. 
 
The idea of attack injection to find vulnerabilities is introduced in AJECT [2]. The 
paper describes that the tool AJECT generates attacks with respect to some 
pre-defined test classes by using a specification of server’s communication protocol. 
4 
 
AJECT performs these attacks through the network while it monitors the behavior of 
the server both from a client perspective and inside the target machine. Incorrect 
behavior indicates a successful attack and potential existence of vulnerability. A 
fuzzing system performs a brute force attack without pre-defining test classes [17]. It 
will not monitor state of the target, and the system will keep on fuzzing until it 
crashes. By obtaining those crashes in the system, vulnerabilities can be identified. 
 
There is no publicly available similar work or study concerned with distributed 
fuzzing system, although some premature concepts have been allegedly used by 
Microsoft to find 1800 Office bugs [17]. There are several fuzzing frameworks and 
tools, such as SPIKE [9], Powerfuzzer [48], OWASP JBroFuzz [49], etc. These 
frameworks are implemented in a centralized manner, so that they can not fuzz 
applications in a complete way due to limitations of time and resources. To improve 
these fuzzing frameworks, we take advantage of a grid environment to design a 
distributed and extensible fuzzing system, in which we use SPIKE as an example 
framework to perform fuzzing. All fuzzing tasks are independent, and are distributed 
to the network resources. With aids from remote resources, the fuzzing system 
achieves the goal of high efficiency in performing fuzzing applications. 
 
For the purpose of coordinating service, an alternative to ZooKeeper is DepSpace 
[10]. As the system considers an unlimited set of clients that interact with a set of n 
servers, design and implementation of secure and fault-tolerant tuple space in n 
servers are investigated in DepSpace. The tuple space implemented by a set of tuple 
space servers can be considered as a shared memory object which provides 
operations for storing and retrieving ordered data sets. As long as less than a third of 
service replicas are assumed to be faulty, the service offered by DepSpace is secure, 
reliable and available. In this project, we use ZooKeeper [12, 24] to coordinate 
distributed services. ZooKeeper incorporates elements from group messaging, 
shared registers, and distributes lock services in replicated and centralized services. 
ZooKeeper provides a platform for distributed processes to coordinate with each 
other through a shared hierarchal name space of data registers (znodes), much like a 
file system. It provides the abstraction of znodes that can be manipulated through 
the ZooKeeper API. To avoid complicated situation of processing requests which 
depend on responses and failure detection of other clients, an API is intended to 
manipulate simple wait-free data objects organized hierarchically. Both DepSpace 
and ZooKeeper use replication, yet there is important difference. For DepSpace, 
replicas are supposed to tolerate Byzantine failures; while ZooKeeper’s replicated 
service is mainly to tolerate replicas’ crashes, achieving high availability and 
performance. 
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Chapter 2 Concepts and Techniques 
There are two basic concepts in security: trustworthiness and trust. Trustworthiness 
measures how much a component, subsystem or system meets a set of properties. 
Trust defines the accepted dependence of a component on a set of properties of 
another component, subsystem or system. These properties refer to functional or 
non-functional. From perspectives of trustworthiness and trust, trust can be put on 
an untrustworthy system even though the system does not satisfy a set of properties. 
Specifically, both software and its users trust much stuff which should not be trusted. 
For example, software bought from other companies or other countries may have a 
backdoor left by the programmer. As a result, it is high likely that the users will suffer 
losses from the untrusted system. So it is better to evaluate the system’s 
trustworthiness before placing trust on system components. 
 
By definition, vulnerabilities are system defects that may be exploited by an attacker 
to subvert the security policies, thereby impact system’s confidentiality, integrity or 
availability. Vulnerabilities are exactly those untrustworthy elements which should be 
eliminated in the system. Basically, there are three types of vulnerabilities: design 
vulnerabilities, implementation vulnerabilities, and operational vulnerabilities. They 
can be exploited through attack interfaces [16], which are collections of possible 
entry points accessed by anyone regardless of their roles in the system. Specifically, 
attack surface refers to pre-defined components by software developers when the 
system is in the design phase, with which anyone can interact, such as socket and 
inter-process communication [50], APIs, files, user interface, operating system, 
environment variables and program arguments, etc. Malicious attackers can take 
advantage of entry points to explore vulnerabilities in a system. Consequently, a 
successful intrusion is achieved by attacking on vulnerabilities.  
 
As mentioned before, theoretically trust should not be placed on those 
untrustworthy systems. In practice, it is the reverse. As a result, malformed inputs 
can be taken advantage of by an attacker to perform attack injection in a system if 
some vulnerability is successfully explored. The inputs can never be trusted in terms 
of the following aspects: first, an attacker can pass malformed arguments to any 
program parameter. For example, even though the shell imposes limits on input, an 
attacker may still be able to call the program by getting around the shell. Second, 
things left by the parent process can be taken advantage of by an attacker. Also, 
environment variables can result in an attacker gaining root access, giving the 
attacker more privileges to do something unexpected to the system, such as deleting 
system files, modifying system configurations, etc.  
 
This chapter is composed of three sections. First, we introduce three types of attacks. 
Then the main techniques and concepts used in this thesis are presented: grid 
computing, fuzzing, ZooKeeper, Apache. The third section briefly describes the 
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development environment used for this thesis. 
2.1 Attacks 
Considering that the objective of a fuzzing tool SPIKE’s capability to find 
vulnerabilities, we present three vulnerabilities and the corresponding attacks in this 
section: buffer overflow, SQL injection and format string. These three vulnerabilities 
are some of the most often discovered using SPIKE.  
2.1.1 Buffer overflow 
Buffer overflows [57, 64] happen when use of a buffer is not checked, such as 
neglecting to check data size, which allows an attacker to overwrite data that 
controls the program execution path and hijack the control of the program to 
execute the attacker’s code instead of program code. As data is mainly stored in stack, 
heap, or BSS(block started by symbol) [59] segments, the overflowed buffer will 
cause the application that owns the buffer to become unstable, or crash, resulting in 
denial of service (DoS) [58]. Programs written in C/C++ language are most susceptible 
to buffer overflow attacks. 
 
There are mainly two types of overflow attacks: stack overflow [61] and heap 
overflow [62, 63]. Stack overflow occurs when too much memory is used on the call 
stack. The call stack has limited amount of memory, which is determined at the start 
of one program. Its size depends on many aspects, such as machine architecture, 
programing language, multi-threading, etc. When too much memory is used on the 
stack, it is highly likely to result in a program crash. Heap overflow happens in the 
heap data area. As memory on the heap is dynamically allocated by the program at 
run-time, the attack is launched by corrupting data in the memory to cause the 
application to overwrite internal structures, such as linked list structures. As a result, 
data at specific location can be altered in an arbitrary way, or arbitrary code can be 
executed. 
2.1.2 SQL injection 
To understand how the input is ill-constructed to incur security problems, we would 
like to introduce the concept of metacharacter. A metacharacter [51] refers to a 
special character in a program or data field which provides information about other 
characters, such as ‘^’, ‘*’, ‘|’, ‘;’, etc. Rather than their special meaning, these 
metacharacters can be used by attackers to explore vulnerabilities in the system. The 
most typical problems are embedded delimiters, NULL character injection and 
truncation.  
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In applications, the input fields always trust commands given by users containing 
only characters, not metacharacters. As a result, metacharacters are always 
introduced by attacker to explore vulnerabilities, which appear when constructing 
strings with filenames, registry paths (Microsoft Windows), Email addresses, SQL 
statements and adding user data to file.  
 
SQL injection is the most serious and wide-spread threat based upon lack of proper 
input validation. From the OWASP Top 10 2010 [22], SQL injection is in the first 
position of the top 10. SQL injection is a code-injection attack where data submitted 
by the user is included in an SQL query, such that part of user’s data is treated as SQL 
code [30]. Database often contains sensitive information, such as user account 
number, password, etc. As a result, database security violations can cause identity 
theft, loss of confidential information. The following lists the strategies frequently 
used in SQL injection: 
 
 Tautology: inject code in one or more conditional statements so that they always 
evaluate to true. The intent is to bypass authentication, identify injectable 
parameters and extract data. 
 
 Union query: exploits a vulnerable parameter to change the data set returned 
for a given query, so that application can be tricked to return data from a table 
which is not intended by the developer. The intent is to bypass authentication to 
extract data. 
 
 Piggy-backed query: add additional queries into the original query, and require 
database configured to accept multiple statements in a single string. The intent is 
to extract data, add or modify data, perform denial of service attack, and execute 
remote commands. 
 
 Stored procedures: execute stored procedures present in the database, 
statements can be passed to stored procedures, vulnerable to piggy-backed 
query, union query. The intent is to escalate privilege, perform denial of service 
and execute remote commands. 
 
 Illegal/incorrect queries: inject statements that cause syntax error, type error, 
and logical error. Syntax error can be used to identify injectable parameters, and 
type error and logical error can deduce data types and reveal names of tables 
and columns that caused error. The intent is to identify injectable parameters, 
perform database finger-printing, and extract data. 
 
 Inference: modify the query to recast it in the form of an action that is executed 
based upon the answer to a true or false question. Blind injection (infer 
information by asking true or false) and timing attacks (gain information by 
observing time delays from response) are the two well-known attack techniques. 
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The intent is to identify injectable parameters, extract data, and determine data 
schema. 
 
 Alternate encodings: modify the injected text so as to avoid detections of 
defensive coding practice and automated prevention techniques (e.g., 
Hexadecimal, ASCII, and Unicode). Common scanning and detection techniques 
do not to evaluate all specially encoded strings, leaving these attacks to go 
undetected. The intent of alternate encoding is to evade detection. 
2.1.3 Format string 
Format string vulnerabilities [64] happen most frequently when a programmer prints 
a string which contains data supplied by user. The format string attack stems from 
the use of unfiltered user inputs which performs formatting, such as mistakenly 
writing printf(buffer). For example, the format token “%s” can be used to print data 
from the stack or other locations in memory. Also, an attacker can write arbitrary 
data to any locations by using “%n” format token. A typical exploit is to combine 
these techniques to force a program to overwrite the address of a library function or 
the return address in the stack with a pointer pointing to malicious shell code. Most 
of the format string bugs are caused by C language’s non-type-safe argument passing 
conventions.  
2.2 Techniques 
As described in section 1.1, large applications demand much more resources for 
security testing. We are going to discuss in detail how to establish the fuzzing system 
to test large application’s vulnerabilities efficiently. In this section, several important 
techniques used in this project are listed. 
2.2.1 Grid computing  
In grid computing [4, 18, 23, 41] (or in a computational grid), the solution of a 
scientific or technical problem, which usually requires a great number of computer 
processing cycles or access to a large amount of data, is accomplished by using the 
remote resources of many computers in the network. Grid computing requires the 
use of software that can divide and farm out pieces of a program to as many as 
thousands of computers in the network. It can be regarded as distributed and 
large-scale cluster computing [52] and as a form of network-distributed parallel 
processing. Grid computing can be confined to the network of computer 
workstations within a corporation or it can be a public collaboration. A well-known 
example of grid computing in the public domain is the ongoing SETI [39, 40] (Search 
for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) @Home project, in which thousands of people share 
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the unused processor cycles of their PCs in the vast search for signs of "rational" 
signals from outer space. Figure 2.1 represents the architecture of a grid computing 
system. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Grid Computing Environment 
Grid computing coordinates disparate information technology resources across the 
network using middleware, which allows them to function as a whole virtually. In 
computational grids, a wide variety of geographically distributed computational 
resources, such as supercomputers, computer clusters, storage systems, data sources, 
instruments, people, can share, select and aggregate information; and they can be 
presented as single or unified resources for solving large-scale and data-intensive 
computing applications (e.g., molecular modeling for drug design brain activity 
analysis, and high energy physics).  A grid is built from multi-purpose protocols and 
interfaces that address such fundamental issues as authentication, authorization, 
resource discovery, and resource access.  
 
Grid computing uses a given amount of computer resources more cost-effectively, 
solving problems that can not be approached without an enormous amount of 
computing power. The computing grid’s goal, like that of the electrical grid, is to 
provide users with access to the resources whenever they need them. Grids have 
realized two goals: providing remote access to information technology assets, and 
aggregating processing power. The most obvious resource included in a grid is a 
processor, but grids also encompass sensors, data-storage systems, applications and 
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other resources. 
2.2.2 Fuzzing 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, traditional testing focuses mostly on verifying functional 
properties, so that the testers build test cases and scenarios based on the system 
requirements. For finding vulnerabilities, like command injection [53], this approach 
does not work. What traditional testing missed are things that the software should 
not do or should not allow, and that is strongly required in security testing. 
 
Security testing includes many aspects. In this thesis, we studied performing security 
testing in the input space. Theoretically, all possible combination of inputs should be 
sent to the application for exploring vulnerabilities in system. For example, 
considering the case of 10 forms/application, 10 fields/form, and 62 characters/field, 
the ideal test inputs is: 50621010 ×× . The example just counts how many valid 
inputs there are to test those fields. If considering invalid characters, such as ‘ ’, ‘<’, 
‘%’, ‘|’, ‘;’, ‘*’, more inputs have to be tested. Furthermore, there are much more 
input fields in complicated systems. Thus, it can be concluded that much more time 
and efforts have to be spent on those complicated systems for security testing. And 
the fact also indicates that security testing requires more CPUs, memories, hard disk 
storage than functional based testing, etc. 
 
Fuzzing [9, 43, 44] is a software testing technique, which provides invalid, 
unexpected or random data to the inputs of a program. If the program fails (e.g., by 
crashing), the defects can be noted, which can be of help to improve software quality. 
There are three kinds of fuzzing: 
 
 Random fuzzing: random inputs are generated; 
 Recursive fuzzing: iterating through all combination of characters from an 
alphabet; 
 Replacive fuzzing: iterating through a set of predefined values – fuzz vectors. 
 
Ideally, all type of program inputs can be fuzzed, but file formats and network 
protocols are the most common targets of fuzzing. Those interesting inputs include 
environment variables, keyboard and mouse events, and sequences of API calls. Even 
the items which are not normally considered "input" can also be fuzzed, such as the 
contents of databases, shared memories, or the precise interleaving of threads [43]. 
Inputs may cross trust boundaries [54], such as network sockets, pipes, RPC 
interfaces. These input fields strongly require fuzzing for addressing security issues. 
 
Fuzzing is often used in large software development projects that employ black-box 
testing [45]. However, fuzzing is neither substitute nor formal method for exhaustive 
testing, because it can only provide a random sample of the system's behavior, not 
an overview of the system security. In many cases passing a fuzzing may only 
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demonstrate that a piece of software can handle exceptions without crashing, rather 
than behaving correctly. Thus, fuzzing can only be regarded as an assurance of overall 
quality rather than a bug-finding tool. As a gross measurement of reliability, fuzzing 
can suggest which parts of a program should get special attention, in the form of a 
code audit, application of static analysis [55], or partially programming applications. 
 
Fuzzing is accomplished with the help of a fuzzer. At a high level, most fuzzers can be 
categorized into four groups [56]: file fuzzer (file formats), network fuzzer (network 
protocols), general fuzzer (file, network, custom I/O interfaces), and 
customer/one-off fuzzer (a specific format or network protocol). Fuzzing can be 
broken up into six phases: 
 
 Investigate: determine what to fuzz; 
 Modeling: model data and state of the target system; 
 Validate: verify the model is correct and the fuzzer can indeed talk to the system 
in a meaningful way; 
 Monitor: make sure the target system can be monitored; 
 Run: run the fuzzer; 
 Review results: review the findings. 
 
As mentioned in section 1.3, there are many fuzzing frameworks, such as 
Powerfuzzer, OWASP JBroFuzz, Peach Fuzzing Platform, SPIKE, and Evolutionary 
Fuzzing System. In our system, we use SPIKE framework.  
 
SPIKE is a fuzzer creator which has pre-defined fuzzers, and new fuzzers can be added 
as well. As long as most protocols are built around similar data formatting primitives, 
SPIKE supports testing in most of these data formats. The SPIKE can quickly 
reproduce a complex binary protocol, and easily mess with protocols.  
 
Specifically, SPIKE uses data structures, which support lengths and blocks. For testing 
applications, programmers have to define a new spike that will be modified and 
injected. The input of the program must be understood first. And then fields must be 
identified in the input that will be fuzzed. By taking advantage of the loop support in 
SPIKE, we can iterate through all possible combinations to see if they cause any 
aberrant behavior. The spike must be set and initialized before fuzzing. As the SPIKE is 
a kind of “First In First Out” queue, the content in spike must be cleared before each 
round of combination is sent to the buffer. If there is large data payload in SPIKE, 
script can be used to play quickly with the protocol, which can be parsed to call any 
functions found within. 
2.2.3 ZooKeeper coordination service 
ZooKeeper is a centralized service for maintaining configuration, naming, providing 
distributed synchronization and group services. All of these kinds of services are used 
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in some form or another by distributed applications. ZooKeeper itself is intended to 
be replicated over a set of hosts, as shown in Figure 2.2 [8, 12].   
 
 
Figure 2.2 ZooKeeper [24] 
ZooKeeper coordinates distributed processes through a shared hierarchal namespace 
which is organized like a standard file system. To represent the hierarchal namespace, 
the ZooKeeper use znodes, similar to directories and files. There are two types of 
znode states: regular and ephemeral. The regular znode is established and deleted 
explicitly, and it can have children. The ephemeral node can be deleted explicitly or 
removed automatically when the session terminates. Children are not allowed in 
ephemeral node. Typically, a file system is intended for storage, but ZooKeeper is not. 
The ZooKeeper’s data is kept in memory, that data information can be obtained 
timely, achieving high throughput and low latency [12]. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 ZooKeeper's Hierarchical Namespace [24] 
ZooKeeper’s goal is to extract the essence of different distributed processes into an 
easy-communicable interface for coordinating their services. The ZooKeeper 
implements consensus, group management, and presence protocols, which saves 
efforts of distributed processes to apply them [12]. 
2.2.4 Apache HTTP server 
The Apache HTTP Server [14] is a robust, commercial-grade, and freely-available 
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source code implementation of an HTTP (Web) server, which is notable for playing a 
key role in the initial growth of the World Wide Web (WWW). Most web servers 
using Apache run a Unix-like operating system, which behave similarly to a UNIX 
system, but not necessarily conform to or are certified to any version of UNIX 
specification. Apache is primarily used to provide service for both static content and 
dynamic web pages on the World Wide Web [25]. In our system, as ZooKeeper is not 
designed for storage purpose, Apache HTTP server is mainly used for storing files, 
paralleling with ZooKeeper’s records. The Apache HTTP server provides a 
downloading service to remote resources, where files need to be available in a 
secure and reliable way. In addition, the HTTP server can provide download service. 
2.3 Development environment 
Development of the project was based on a local-area environment composed by 
VMware virtual machines [19], in which the Apache HTTP server, the resource, the 
broker, and ZooKeeper can be executed.  
 
Overall speaking, the Apache HTTP server was installed in the local environment, and 
the broker split a fuzzing job into many tasks and inserted these fuzzing tasks into the 
Apache HTTP server, while established corresponding znodes in ZooKeeper. A local 
resource is developed to testing whether fuzzing tasks could be downloaded and 
executed. 
 
Later, the grid fuzzing system was tested in a distributed manner. One computer was 
used as the server to install the ZooKeeper server and HTTP server, and the computer 
was deemed as the grid fuzzing server providing fuzzing services in the network. 
Several other computers acted as remote resources, which were directed to connect 
the fuzzing server to contribute fuzzing applications.  
 
The environment used involved the following: 
 OS: Ubuntu 9.10, Windows XP 
 Tools: Apache HTTP Server 2.2, ZooKeeper 3.3.2, VMware 7.0, Eclipse 3.5.2, Java 
1.6.0_15, SPIKE  
 Languages: Java, C 
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Chapter 3 The Grid Fuzzing System 
The goal of the project is to simplify the complicated, time-consuming and 
resource-consuming process of software security testing. For attaining this goal, we 
propose a grid fuzzing system to allow fuzzing applications using many free resources 
in the network, in order to parallelize the fuzzing process and allow trying many 
different inputs. There are some initial concepts that have to be kept in mind: a 
fuzzing job refers to the application (from the client) the grid fuzzing system fuzzes; a 
fuzzing task refers to part of the application input space that are fuzzed; one fuzzing 
job is composed of many fuzzing tasks, and thus fuzzing all tasks in one fuzzing job 
successfully represents one fuzzing job is finished.  
 
For coordinating those remote resources to fetch tasks, fuzz tasks and upload fuzzing 
results, we take advantage of the ZooKeeper coordination service and the Apache 
HTTP server. Specifically, divided fuzzing tasks will be stored in the HTTP server, while 
information of tasks will be recorded in ZooKeeper. The grid environment system will 
publish some links in order to invite remote resources’ participation. Once a remote 
resource agrees to contribute the fuzzing process, it will go to the ZooKeeper and 
pick the description of a task, then to the Apache HTTP server, and download the 
task, and finally perform the fuzzing. The record corresponding to the fuzzing task 
state in ZooKeeper is modified by remote resource which fuzzed the task, in order to 
prevent other resources from getting the same fuzzing task. By making use of free 
resources in the network to fuzz tasks, fuzzing one application can be accomplished 
efficiently. At the same time, free resources in the network are utilized in a much 
more efficient way. 
 
As fuzzing jobs is the main objective of the grid fuzzing system, the core of the 
fuzzing system is to coordinate the broker, HTTP server, Zookeepr and remote 
resources to achieve fuzzing all fuzzing tasks of each fuzzing job. Figure 3.1 
demonstrates how the system works. 
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Figure 3.1 Schematic architecture of the grid fuzzing system 
The meanings of the labels used in the figure are explained in the following: 
 Client A(B,C…)—those entities who want to fuzz their applications; 
 Broker—responsible for splitting a fuzzing job into many fuzzing tasks; 
 Apache HTTP Server—provides storing and downloading of fuzzing tasks; 
 ZooKeeper Server—parallels with Apache HTTP server for coordinating service; 
 Step 1—get unexecuted fuzzing task information from ZooKeeper server; 
 Step 2—based on the ZooKeeper information, fetch (download) corresponding 
fuzzing task from Apache server ; 
 Feedback—execution results of fuzzing tasks which will be finally sent back to 
clients. 
3.1 System Components 
The grid fuzzing system includes the components of clients, the broker, ZooKeeper 
server, Apache HTTP server and remote resources. Next we explain their roles played 
in the system in more detail. 
3.1.1 Clients 
Clients are those entities who want to fuzz their applications, such as governments, 
financial departments. Usually, they concentrate more on using applications for daily 
business or management issues, so that they prefer to obviate the boring process of 
testing applications, or they do not have professional staff, enough hardware or 
software resources to support security testing. Nevertheless, to ensure that their 
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applications are secure enough, they send applications to the broker and possibly 
pay for the security testing. Clients will be informed of feedback by the broker when 
security testing results are available. 
3.1.2 Broker 
Broker’s role is played by entities like a software-development company or security 
testing agency. Generally, the broker has two responsibilities: one is coordinating 
fuzzing service, and the other is fuzzing job and task states management (e.g., task 
execution failure).  
 
As fuzzing one application requires a large amount of time and resources, the broker 
is mainly responsible to coordinate fuzzing tasks in remote resources using 
ZooKeeper and the HTTP server. The broker first splits one fuzzing job into many 
fuzzing tasks, and then uploads split fuzzing tasks to the corresponding 
pre-established fuzzing job directory in the Apache HTTP server, while records the 
fuzzing job and tasks information in ZooKeeper’s znodes.  
 
Besides coordinating service, we also consider other features of the broker. It is 
inevitable that occasionally something unexpected occurs on the remote resource 
side, such as downloading failure, fuzzing failure. To prevent such accidents, each 
remote resource will be given a fixed amount of time for downloading, executing a 
fuzzing task and updating the corresponding znode with the fuzzing results. What the 
broker does is to monitor each task periodically, checking if a fuzzing task is out of 
time. If so, the task state will be reset in the ZooKeeper, so that other remote 
resources can compete to fetch the task as usual.  
 
The broker also updates fuzzing job information by checking if all fuzzing tasks are 
finished. Once the broker notices one fuzzing job’s information is changed, which 
indicates that the job is finished, the job state will be replaced with a new state. For 
collecting fuzzing results of one fuzzing job, the broker would check each fuzzing job 
node at a certain time. If there is change in the job node state, the broker will 
immediately collect all fuzzing results from the fuzzing task znodes under the fuzzing 
job znode in ZooKeeper.  
 
After fuzzing results collection is done, the broker will delete the job node and all 
task nodes in ZooKeeper, as well delete fuzzing task files and fuzzing job directory in 
the HTTP server. The fuzzing results will be kept in a .log file, which will be sent back 
to the clients.  
3.1.3 Servers 
There are two servers worked in the grid fuzzing system—Apache HTTP server and 
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ZooKeeper server. The HTTP server is mainly used by the broker to establish fuzzing 
job directories for storing fuzzing tasks, and provides downloading fuzzing tasks 
(executable binary file developed by C language) to remote resources in the network. 
 
ZooKeeper keeps the records of fuzzing job and task information in consistence with 
their state. The broker inserts fuzzing jobs and tasks into the Apache HTTP server, 
and creates the corresponding znodes in ZooKeeper. In ZooKeeper, a parent znode is 
established to represent one fuzzing job, under which there are many child znodes 
created for the split fuzzing tasks. Both parent znodes and child znodes contain 
related information. Specifically, each parent znode contains information if the job is 
finished or not. Each child node has the following information: task is executed or not, 
task is downloaded or not, task execution commands.  
 
The broker can get informed from ZooKeeper whether one job is finished or not. If 
the job is finished, the broker can get fuzzing results from its children. And 
ZooKeeper provides resources with information of unexecuted fuzzing task (if one 
task is unexecuted, the resource will download and execute it).  
3.1.4 Resources 
Generally, the network resources are invited by clicking links published by the broker, 
or other methods around. They will be given the resource-side code, which is an 
executable binary program. If resources join the fuzzing process, they will first be 
directed to connect ZooKeeper, where they can obtain unexecuted fuzzing tasks 
information. In the following steps, they will go directly to the Apache HTTP server 
and download corresponding unexecuted tasks indicated in ZooKeeper’s fuzzing task 
znodes. Fuzzing will be completed in the local resources automatically right after 
fuzzing tasks are downloaded successfully. Also, fuzzing results are automatically sent 
back to the task znodes in ZooKeeper. 
 
Due to the fact that there might be many remote resources to pick the same fuzzing 
task at the same time in the network, race conditions [60] are a big problem. One 
fuzzing task may be executed by many remote resources, while the others are left 
unattended. To prevent occurrence of this problem, each remote resource that wants 
to obtain a fuzzing task is required to establish a lock node as a child under the 
fuzzing task node. All remote resources requesting the fuzzing task are lined up and 
each remote resource obtains the lock in the order of request arrival time. By 
comparing sequence numbers, the remote resource that has the lowest sequence 
number will be allocated the fuzzing task. At the same time, other remote resources 
failing to obtain this fuzzing task will be directed to fetch other unexecuted fuzzing 
tasks in this job directory or other job directory.  
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3.2 System Functionalities 
We mainly have three steps to achieve in this thesis: splitting one fuzzing job into 
many fuzzing tasks, inserting fuzzing jobs and tasks, executing fuzzing tasks and 
sending back fuzzing results. Splitting a fuzzing job is accomplished by developing 
many different fuzzing tasks on one application. To split one fuzzing job, we create 
many programs to fuzz the application with the help of SPIKE. Inserting fuzzing jobs 
and tasks is attended by the broker. Executing fuzzing tasks are handled by free 
remote resources in the network, and also these remote resources will send back 
fuzzing results to the ZooKeeper, which will be contacted by the broker to fetch job 
fuzzing results. Figure 3.2 presents the whole process. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Process of fuzzing one fuzzing job 
3.2.1 Split one fuzzing job 
Following the methodology of SPIKE described in 2.2.2, the first thing to do is 
implementing SPIKE to create many fuzzing tasks when a fuzzing job is received from 
the client. We assumed that each task fuzzes a subset of the input fields. Basically, 
each fuzzing task is composed of two processes: one process is to enable feeding 
pre-constructed data to the input space automatically; the other process is to detect 
any abnormalities happened when the application is running.  
 
First, the input is analyzed to find out which part is fixed, and which part is variable. 
Those variable parts are the targets to fuzz. For example, one program called palette 
that requires a .png file as input. By studying the specification of .png file, we learned 
that each .png file starts with fixed 8-byte signature, thus it is not necessary to fuzz 
this field, because the program itself may simply regard files with different signatures 
as false and then reject them. On the contrary, IDAT [28] chunk in a .png file contains 
the image data that can be varied in order to generate different .png files. So fuzzing 
IDAT chunk is a good choice. If the fuzzing object is too large, we can simply create a 
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script (.spk file) to contain part of the fuzzing data. 
 
To detect aberrant behavior, the application is triggered, and begins to accept data 
stream from the fuzzing process. Any abnormality in the execution process will be 
detected by status change. Eventually, executable binary files generated from 
detecting fuzzing application’s abnormalities will be inserted in the HTTP server and 
recorded in ZooKeeper server, available for remote resources to download and 
execute.  
 
Considering that there are many free network resources, we decide to allocate each 
fuzzing task within a certain time of work load which can be configured in relation to 
demand. In this grid fuzzing system, we just allocate 30 minutes for each fuzzing task. 
If the fuzzing task is out of time, its state will be reset as the initial state, so that 
other remote resource can pick this task to fuzz. Imposing a constant time on a 
fuzzing task provides convenience to quantitatively manage task state by the broker, 
guarantying fuzzing efficiency.  
 
To achieve this, we need some strategies to divide one fuzzing job. First, we simply 
develop the fuzzing program to fuzz some fields of the input space. And then we 
divide the fuzzing set into fuzzing subsets, which are used in the same fuzzing 
program to fuzz the specified fields. By evaluating the time one fuzzing subset takes 
to finish fuzzing, we can adjust the number and volume of the fuzzing subsets as 
needed. Figure 3.3 gives a simple example how the set is split. The fuzzing set 
contains 1000 numbers, and it is split into 20 subsets, with 50 numbers in each 
subset. All fuzzing subsets work with the same fuzzing model as the fuzzing set. 
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Figure 3.3 Generate fuzzing subsets 
3.2.2 Insert fuzzing jobs & tasks 
After successfully generated fuzzing tasks (executable binary files), the next step is 
inserting executable files (fuzzing jobs and fuzzing tasks) into the Apache HTTP server 
and creating corresponding znodes in ZooKeeper.  
 
The Apache HTTP server cooperates with ZooKeeper to manage fuzzing jobs and 
fuzzing tasks. First, the broker will always check how many fuzzing job directories in 
the local environment, and then create new fuzzing job directories in the Apache 
HTTP server if they are not fully covered.  
 
Similar things will be done in ZooKeeper simultaneously, and new fuzzing job znodes 
will be created. Then fuzzing tasks under each fuzzing job will be sent to the 
corresponding fuzzing job directory in the Apache server. In ZooKeeper, these fuzzing 
tasks are deemed as children of one fuzzing job, thus under the parent znode of a 
fuzzing job, child znodes of fuzzing tasks are created.  
 
Considering extensibility of the fuzzing system, the broker always checks each fuzzing 
job directory in the local environment to see if there are new fuzzing tasks added into 
the current directory. If so, the broker will pick up them and place them in the same 
way as described above, and Zookeeper will create znodes for them as well. This is 
quite an important attribute that it spares time and space for creating extra fuzzing 
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tasks, so that the broker can fuzz more objects or add new fuzzing combinations if 
new requirements are requested from clients, avoiding inadequacy in the process of 
fuzzing and making fuzzing process more flexible. From the practical point of view, 
this property guarantees extensibility of the gird fuzzing system.  
3.2.3 Execute fuzzing tasks 
The execution of fuzzing tasks is performed by the remote resources in network.  
Those free network resources that are willing to contribute fuzzing process will be 
allocated with unexecuted fuzzing tasks. To avoid repeated downloading, once the 
resource has downloaded one fuzzing task, ZooKeeper would update data 
information of fuzzing task by indicating that it has been downloaded, which in 
return helps other resources to decide which task is available.  
 
As described in 3.1.4, concurrence happens when one task is picked up from HTTP 
server by one resource, but the task state in ZooKeeper is not updated promptly. As a 
result, more than two remote resources thought they obtained a different fuzzing 
task, but actually they are racing for the same task. As there are thousand millions of 
resources in the network, consequently, one fuzzing task may be downloaded and 
executed by many remote resources at the same time, while other fuzzing tasks are 
still pending for remote resources’ attention. To prevent this kind of problem, a lock 
can be added to each fuzzing task node. Whenever one resource wants to pick up a 
locked fuzzing task which has previously been taken away by another remote 
resource, the fuzzing grid system will automatically direct this resource to deal with 
another new fuzzing task available.  
 
After execution of fuzzing tasks is completed by remote resources, the fuzzing results 
will be feedback to ZooKeeper server. If one fuzzing task failed to be executed due to 
special situations, such as interruption, abnormal exit, the remote resource did not 
need to execute the fuzzing task again, because the fuzzing task state would be 
updated by the broker if it was out of time. Another remote resource in the network 
would pick the failed fuzzing task for execution. When the failed remote resource 
managed to work for fuzzing service again, it will be allocated with a new fuzzing 
task. 
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Chapter 4 Practical Implementation 
Thus far, we have given an overview of the grid fuzzing system, and introduced its 
main functionalities. For deeply exploit the grid fuzzing system, in this chapter, we 
are going to discuss in detail how those components (ZooKeeper, Apache HTTP server, 
broker and remote resources in the network) of the grid fuzzing system work, and 
how they cooperate consistently to complete fuzzing jobs. 
4.1 ZooKeeper 
To use ZooKeeper server, we must get acquainted with how it is configured and how 
it starts to work.  
 
After downloading and decompressing ZooKeeper, a configuration file zoo.cfg is 
created with the following lines: 
 
tickTime=2000; 
dataDir=/Desktop/ZooKeeper/zookeeper-log;  
clientPort=2181 
 
TickTime is the basic time unit in milliseconds used by ZooKeeper, which is used to do 
heartbeats and the minimum session timeout will be twice the tickTime. DataDir is 
the location to store the in-memory database snapshots and, unless specified 
otherwise, the transaction log of updates to the database. ClientPort is the port to 
listen for client connections [12]. 
 
And then, ZooKeeper is started by calling the shell script in the terminal: 
 
bin/zkServer.sh start  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the status of successfully started Zookeeper server. 
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Figure 4.1 Start ZooKeeper server 
To use the ZooKeeper service, an application must firstly be instantiated as an object 
of ZooKeeper class. All the interactions are done by calling specific methods of this 
class. In this project, the broker and remote resources in network will communicate 
with ZooKeeper directly, so that they contain object of the ZooKeeper class. If the 
broker or resources in the network would like to connect the ZooKeeper, the 
following command is executed: 
 
bin/zkCli.sh -server 127.0.0.1:2181 
 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates a connection of the broker/resources to the ZooKeeper 
server. 
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Figure 4.2 Connect to ZooKeeper 
In the grid fuzzing system, the broker connects ZooKeeper to insert fuzzing jobs and 
tasks, or get fuzzing results. And remote resources connect ZooKeeper to obtain 
fuzzing tasks and send feedback to it. To make the connection go on automatically, 
the broker and remote resources are designed to connect ZooKeeper using the 
following Java code: 
 
final static String ZookeeperServer = "127.0.0.1:2181"; 
zkoperator.connect(ZookeeperServer); 
 
As mentioned in 2.3, the development of this system is based on a local environment, 
so that the ZooKeeper is connected by sending connection request to 127.0.0.1, 
saving the effort to send and receive requests. In a distributed system, ZooKeeper 
server’s address is the server’s IP address. 
4.2 Broker 
After fuzzing tasks are ready, the primary work of the broker is to insert them into 
the Apache server, while creating the corresponding znodes in ZooKeeper. Specifically, 
the broker has the following functionalities: 
 
 Create the fuzzing job directory in Apache server if a fuzzing job has not been 
established before; the following code gives an instance how to create a fuzzing 
job directory: 
 
File dstdir=new File(Dst_JobDir); 
success = dstdir.mkdir(); 
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And Figure 4.3 shows the result, in which a directory (“palettefuzz”) is 
successfully created. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Create job directory in Apache HTTP server 
 Upload fuzzing tasks of one fuzzing job into Apache server; the following code is 
used to achieve this process and figure 4.4 shows that two fuzzing tasks 
(“gopherd” and “palfuzz_task1”) are uploaded successfully in the “palettefuzz” 
job directory. 
 
public static void taskInsert(File localFileName, File desFileName) throws IOException 
{ 
  InputStream     inStream = new FileInputStream(localFileName);; 
  OutputStream    outStream = new FileOutputStream(desFileName); 
  byte[] buf = new byte[1024]; 
  int len; 
   
     while ((len = inStream.read(buf)) > 0) 
      outStream.write(buf, 0, len); 
 
     inStream.close(); 
     outStream.close(); 
 } 
for (int j=0;j<locdir.listFiles().length;j++) 
{ 
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TaskNode = locfolder.listFiles()[i].getName()+"/"+fuzztask.taskname; 
File localTask=new File(localFuzzdir+TaskNode); 
File dstTask=new File(dstFuzzdir+TaskNode); 
jtinsert.taskInsert(localTask, dstTask); 
} 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Insert job and tasks into Apache HTTP server 
 If new fuzzing tasks are added, they can also be inserted into the Apache server, 
and be recorded in ZooKeeper; this is performed by the following code and a 
successful instance is shown in figure 4.5, where a new task (“halflife”) is 
inserted into the “palette” job directory. 
 
for(int k=0; k<TaskNum; k++) 
{ 
  File tmpDstFile=new File(Path_Fuzzingtask[k])); 
 
if(!tmpDstFile.exists()) 
{ 
TaskNode = TaskPath; 
File localTask=new File(localFuzzdir + TaskNode); 
jtinsert.taskInsert(localTask, tmpDstFile); 
} 
} 
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Figure 4.5 Insert new tasks 
 If new fuzzing jobs are added, new directories will be established in the HTTP 
server and the corresponding tasks will be inserted into the Apache HTTP server, 
and recorded in ZooKeeper. Figure 4.6 shows the results. 
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Figure 4.6 Instance of adding one new fuzzing job 
 Connect the ZooKeeper server, and record fuzzing job and fuzzing tasks 
information. Figure 4.7 shows the fuzzing task state in ZooKeeper after being 
inserted. 
 
String info2=TaskInformation; 
byte[] taskinfo=new byte[info2.length()]; 
taskinfo=info2.getBytes(); 
 
zkoperator.create(TaskPath,taskinfo); 
 
30 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Record job and task in ZooKeeper 
 Monitor those fuzzing tasks under each fuzzing job. If one fuzzing task is out of 
time, the task will be reset in the ZooKeeper, and other remote resource can 
compete for this fuzzing task again. Meanwhile, the monitor checks if all fuzzing 
tasks results are available. If so, fuzzing job node should be updated by indicating 
that the fuzzing job is finished. Figure 4.8 illustrates the node state. 
 
if (TaskDataInfo.contains(DownLoadInfo)) 
if(Day == 0) 
{ 
if(Hour == 0) 
 { 
  if (Min >= 30) 
   ResetTask = 1; 
 }else ResetTask = 1;        
}else ResetTask = 1; 
 
if(Dataversion >= 2) 
if (!TaskDataInfo.contains(ExePrefix)) 
   if (!TaskDataInfo.contains(DownLoadInfo)) 
    taskcount++; 
    } 
  if(taskcount == AllTasks.size() && taskcount != 0) 
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     zkoperator.setdata(JobPath, JobFinished); 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Upload fuzzing job node 
 Check which fuzzing job is finished by connecting ZooKeeper server, and fetch 
results recorded in fuzzing tasks nodes of ZooKeeper server. Execution results 
will be kept in a ResultsCollec.txt file, which will be sent to corresponding clients. 
Figure 4.9 shows the process. 
 
if(JobDataVersion == 1) 
{ 
TaskData = zkoperator.getData(Taskpath); 
TaskResult.write(tasks.get(tasknode)+ " result "+": "); 
      TaskResult.write(new String(TaskData)+"\n"); 
} 
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Figure 4.9 Write fuzzing task results to file 
 After fetching all results of one fuzzing job, the directory will be deleted in HTTP 
and ZooKeeper server, sparing space for other fuzzing jobs. Figure 4.10 shows 
the result after deleting a job. 
 
tasks = zkoperator.getChild(Jobpath); 
for(int tasknode = 0; tasknode < tasks.size(); tasknode++) 
{ 
     zkoperator.Delete(Taskpath);  
    fuzztask.delete(); 
 } 
   
fuzzjob.delete(); 
zkoperator.Delete(Jobpath); 
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Figure 4.10 Delete job and tasks in HTTP and ZooKeeper servers 
4.3 Resource 
The resource’s work is to obtain unexecuted tasks by downloading them from the 
Apache server. The functionalities are listed below: 
 
 Connect the ZooKeeper, get the unexecuted fuzzing job; 
 
ch=zkoperator.getChild("/"); 
  for(int i=0;i<ch.size();i++) 
{ 
   data=zkoperator.getData("/"+ch.get(i)); 
   datainfor=new String(data); 
   if(datainfor.contains("false")) 
{ 
    fuzzjob=ch.get(i); 
    break; 
    } 
  } 
 
 Pick one unexecuted task from a child znode of one fuzzing job; 
 
ch=zkoperator.getChild(Job); 
  for(int i=0;i<ch.size();i++) 
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{ 
   data=zkoperator.getData(Fuzzingtask[i]); 
   datainfor=new String(data); 
   if(datainfor.contains("false")) 
{ 
    fuzztask=ch.get(i); 
    break; 
    } 
  } 
 
 Check if there are other remote resources trying to pick up the same fuzzing 
task; 
 
zkoperator.CreateLock(LockNode); 
LockRequestQueue = zkoperator.getChild(LockNode); 
 
for(int request = 0; request < LockRequestQueue.size();request++) 
{ 
 if(Sequence > NodeSeq[request]) 
         Seqtmp =NodeSequence[request]; 
  if(Sequence!= Seqtmp) break; 
 } 
if(Seqtmp == Sequence) 
TaskAvailable=1; 
 
 Download unexecuted task from Apache server, and update information in the 
ZooKeeper; Figure 4.11 shows the new state after a fuzzing task is downloaded. 
 
public static void downloadUrl(String fAddress, String localFileName, String destinationDir) 
{ 
      InputStream     inStream = null; 
      OutputStream    outStream = null; 
      URLConnection   uCon = null; 
 
   URL Url=new URL(fAddress); 
   byte[] buf= new byte[size]; 
   int ByteRead,ByteWritten=0; 
    
   outStream = new BufferedOutputStream(new 
     FileOutputStream(destinationDir+localFileName)); 
    
   uCon = Url.openConnection(); 
   inStream = uCon.getInputStream(); 
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   while ((ByteRead = inStream.read(buf)) != -1) { 
    outStream.write(buf, 0, ByteRead); 
    ByteWritten += ByteRead; 
    } 
    
   System.out.println("Downloaded Successfully."); 
   System.out.println("File name:\""+localFileName+ "\"\nNo ofbytes :" + ByteWritten); 
  } 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Download a fuzzing task 
 Execute the task and obtain the execution results; 
 
public byte[] execCmd(String path) throws IOException, InterruptedException 
{ 
  String cmdExec=path; 
  ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder("bash", "-c" ,cmdExec); 
  pb.redirectErrorStream(true);  
  Process shell = pb.start(); 
  InputStream shellIn = shell.getInputStream(); 
  int shellExitStatus = shell.waitFor();  
  System.out.println("The Exit Status is:" +shellExitStatus); 
  ByteArrayOutputStream buffer = new ByteArrayOutputStream();  
  
  // close the stream 
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  try {shellIn.close();} catch (IOException ignoreMe) {}*/ 
  int nRead;  
  byte[] data = new byte[16384];  
    
  while ((nRead = shellIn.read(data, 0, data.length)) != -1)  
    buffer.write(data, 0, nRead);  
    
  buffer.flush();  
  return data; 
 } 
 
 Upload the execution results into the ZooKeeper; Figure 4.12 illustrates it. 
 
zkoperator.setdata(TaskNode, ResourceServ.execCmd("test")); 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Upload fuzzing result 
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Chapter 5 Testing and Results Analysis 
After the system development was concluded, it was tested in a distributed 
environment. To show that our system can be used to test different applications, we 
fuzzed the following three applications:  
 One program called palette that takes a .png file as input, and outputs a 
color-decreased .png file;  
 A second other program called std, which takes three input parameters and then 
prints them on the screen. 
 Another program we fuzzed was json. It takes defaulted-format input, and 
outputs the extracted volumes from the keys. 
5.1 Palette fuzzing 
For executing palette, we have to provide it with one .png [28] file. Following the 
SPIKE methodology, the first step is to understand the format of a .png file. The .png 
file has mainly four chunks: IHDR, PLTE, IDAT, and IEND. Theoretically, all data fields 
can be fuzzed. Yet some fields are not necessary to be fuzzed, because of the fact 
that the program itself has the ability to reject obviously false files (e.g., those that 
do not contain an IHDR chunk). Another reason is that fuzzing some chunk requires 
more data. For example, fuzzing an IDAT chunk needs random length and random 
value, which means that after thousands of attempts we might find some 
vulnerability, but it can take a very long number of attempts. To fuzz palette more 
efficiently, we can choose those fields that have a fixed and low number of bytes, but 
identifying important properties of the .png file, like width, height, bit depth, and 
color in IHDR chunk.  
 
We created two pictures—pic.png and simple.png. The first step is to create many 
fuzzing tasks. We use SPIKE library, SPIKE head files and some related SPIKE C files to 
help develop each fuzzing task. For experimentation, we just fuzzed four fields of the 
input. Each task fuzzed different fields. For example, picpalette1 fuzzed the first two 
bytes of width in IHDR chunk; picpalette2 fuzzed the last two bytes of width in IHDR 
chunk…It is the same way around for other fuzzing tasks. After all fuzzing tasks are 
generated, we created a job directory named “palette” in Apache HTTP server, and 
then copied all fuzzing tasks (executable binary files) into the “palette” directory. 
Then, we connected to ZooKeeper, creating parent node “palette”, under which, all 
fuzzing tasks nodes are created. The “palette” node contains job state information. A 
fuzzing task node, like picpalette1, includes task state information and execution 
command. What needs to be noticed is the “palette” job directory includes 
picpalette fuzzing tasks and simplepalette fuzzing tasks. 
 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show the fuzzing results. 
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Fuzzing tasks 
Time for 
fuzzing(min.sec) 
Vulnerabilities  
found 
picpalette1 2.44  0 
picpalette2 2.38 0 
picpalette3 3.06 2 
picpalette4 10.39 0 
picpalette5 7.55 0 
picpalette6 8.37 2 
picpalette7 9.18 0 
picpalette8 8.10 0 
picpalette9 7.58 1 
picpalette10 8.40 0 
picpalette11 9.04 2 
picpalette12 10 0 
picpalette13 10.16 0 
picpalette14 8.35 0 
picpalette15 9.21 0 
picpalette16 9.24 0 
picpalette17 10.57 2 
picpalette18 10.41 2 
picpalette19 9.40 0 
picpalette21 9.17 1 
picpalette23 7.29 1 
average time 8.21  
Table 5.1  Picpalette fuzzing results 
In the picpalette testing, some fields are repeatedly fuzzed. For example, 
picpalette21 fuzzed the last byte of width and height, and picpalette22 fuzzed the 
last byte of width and the penultimate byte of height. There are some overlaps 
between the two fuzzing tasks, and the vulnerability by chance happened in the 
overlapped fields. That is why both fuzzing tasks found the same vulnerability. After 
comparing these vulnerabilities, there are only 3 different ones found. In practical 
application, efforts must be taken to split a fuzzing job, preventing occurrence of 
overlapped fuzzing sets between fuzzing tasks. As a result, less time is consumed for 
broker to get fuzzing results. In the following simplepalette fuzzing test result table, 
those repeated results are eliminated. 
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Fuzzing tasks 
Time for 
fuzzing(min.sec) 
Fuzzed 
fields 
Vulnerabilities 
found 
Average time 
(Tav(min.sec)) 
simplepalette1 7.22 4 0 
(1) 15.20 
simplepalette2 7.37 4 0 
simplepalette3 5.02 4 0 
simplepalette4 4.27 4 0 
simplepalette5 4.13 4 0 
simplepalette15 3.17 4 2 
simplepalette7 0.49 3 0 
(2) 0.45 
simplepalette8 0.44 3 0 
simplepalette9 0.44 3 0 
simplepalette10 0.44 3 0 
simplepalette11 0.45 3 0 
simplepalette12 0.46 3 0 
simplepalette13 0.03 2 0 
(3) 0.03 
simplepalette14 0.03 2 0 
simplepalette16 0.03 2 0 
simplepalette17 0.03 2 0 
simplepalette18 0.02 2 0 
simplepalette19 0.03 2 0 
Table 5.2  Simplepalette fuzzing 
We tested different numbers of fields. From the average fuzzing time, Tav(3) is 15 
times of Tav(2), and Tav(4) is more than 7 times of Tav(2)(Table 5.2). We can conclude 
that if all tasks are tested in the same environment, time distribution of testing 
different fields would be linear. Based on this assumption, time spent for fuzzing 
different fields can be inferred, so that we can arrange fuzzing time corresponding to 
the condition of the network. In practical application, estimating execution time of a 
fuzzing task is very important, so that the broker can allocate an upper bound time 
for executing a fuzzing task, which in return helps to monitor the fuzzing task state.  
 
The following snapshots figure 5.1, figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 represents the 
vulnerable inputs found in pic.png and simple.png files, which cause the program 
“palette” crash. 
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Figure 5.1 Picpalette11 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Picpalete21 
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Figure 5.3 Simplepalette15 
In figure 5.4, the fields of bit depth and color type were fuzzed, and then one 
vulnerable input was found. In this fuzzing task, fuzzing is designed to end when if 
one vulnerable input was found. Later, fuzzing task was modified in order to find if 
there are new vulnerabilities. But no vulnerability could be found any more. 
Nevertheless, the “01 00” is still deemed as vulnerability, because exception might 
happen at any time in this program. 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Simplepalette3 
5.2 Std fuzzing 
The other program we fuzzed is std. Std is a C program developed by us, which takes 
three strings as input, and the strings are printed on the screen. As long as the 
program only requires 3 parameters, we created a vector with a volume of 89 
possible inputs from the keyboard. We picked fields 2, 3, 4, 6 to see if there is a crash 
caused by potential vulnerable inputs. All these fields will get a value from the vector. 
After the fuzzing programs are ready, we established a std directory in the Apache 
HTTP server, and then send all fuzzing programs into the std directory. Meanwhile, 
parent znode “std” is established in ZooKeeper, and the fuzzing task znodes are 
created under “std”. Fuzzing all std tasks is accomplished in several computers. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the fuzzing result: 
 
Fuzzing tasks Test fields Time (d.h.m.s) Vulnerability 
stdfuzz0 2 0.0.0.26 0 
stdfuzz1 3 0.1.16.57 0 
stdfuzz2 4 4.1.47.52 0 
stdfuzz4 6 1.10.59.03 0 
Table 5.3  Fuzzing std 
The table shows that fuzzing 4 fields took more time than fuzzing 6 fields. This 
happens when the resource which is fuzzing the task with 4 fields has other 
processes going on in the system, hardware resource are not enough to support the 
43 
 
fuzzing task. In practical implementation, it is better to ensure that the network 
resources are free.  
 
The table shows that although std was fuzzed during a time much larger than palette, 
several days in total, no vulnerabilities were found 
5.3 Json fuzzing 
Another program we fuzzed is called json. We borrowed the idea from Json [26, 27] 
data-interchange format. We developed the json program using C. The input space of 
the program requires a string with format “[Name: ***, Age: ***]”; “Name” and “Age” 
are the two keys. The fields with “***” are the volumes which could be combinations 
of characters. Volumes from the two keys are extracted and then printed in the 
console. But there is no specific restrictions on the input format in the program, thus 
it invisibly bury some vulnerabilities in the program. Like what we had done with 
“palette” and “std”, we created fuzzing tasks to fuzz json.c. Specifically, we mainly 
fuzzed two fields in the input space: volumes of name and age. For testing the name, 
30 characters are traversed, and for testing the age, 14 characters are tried. Table 5.4 
is collection of the fuzzing results. 
 
Fuzzing tasks Test fields Time (d.h.m.s) Vulnerability 
jsonfuzz 2 0.0.0.5 1 
jsonfuzz1 3 0.0.2.48 87 
jsonfuzz3 2 0.0.0.2 0 
jsonfuzz4 3 0.0.0.30 0 
jsonfuzz5 2 0.0.0.9 0 
jsonfuzz6 2 0.0.0.2 169 
Table 5.4  Fuzzing json 
Figure 5.5-5.7 shows the tasks that tested out some vulnerable inputs. 
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Figure 5.5 Jsonfuzz 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Jsonfuzz1 
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Figure 5.7 Jsonfuzz6 
From the fuzzing results of json, we got clues to deal with vulnerabilities from the 
input information. The json1 has only one vulnerable input. By increasing the testing 
fields, we could find the vulnerable inputs in a generic way: the program is crashed 
by the three characters: “[”, “]” and “,”. To address these problems, these special 
characters must be carefully handled to prevent vulnerabilities in the program. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Summary 
To promote testing applications efficiently, we proposed a grid computing 
environment for fuzzing, which splits testing one application into testing many fields 
of the application, and made use of network remote resources to test applications 
simultaneously. Generally, the grid fuzzing system has the following attributes: 
  
 Divide one fuzzing job into many fuzzing tasks; 
 
 New fuzzing jobs can be added into the system, and new tasks which are 
intended for existed fuzzing job can be inserted as well.  
 
 ZooKeeper and Apache HTTP server cooperate to coordinate fuzzing service; 
 
 Free network resources can download fuzzing tasks simultaneously from Apache 
HTTP server, execute fuzzing tasks respectively and feedback fuzzing results to 
ZooKeeper automatically; 
 
 In order to prevent multi-remote-resources from executing the same fuzzing task, 
lock is designed in the fuzzing system to eliminate concurrence. 
 
 Considering that fuzzing task can fail in remote resources due to link problem, 
download failure, etc., fuzzing task’s state will be reset if fuzzing task state is not 
uploaded in a certain time after the task is allocated to one particular remote 
resource, so that other resources can fuzz this task again. 
 
 Fuzzing job results in ZooKeeper are collected by the broker; 
 
 For sparing more space for other fuzzing jobs, fuzzed jobs will be deleted by 
broker right after the job’s fuzzing results are obtained. 
 
 Each fuzzing job will be given a .log file for receiving fuzzing results from 
ZooKeeper; 
 
By dividing one fuzzing job into many fuzzing tasks, we can arrange more fuzzing sets 
to test applications in a complete way, so that new vulnerabilities might be found. 
From the fuzzing tests we performed on the three programs—“palette”, “std” and 
“json”, we indeed found some vulnerabilities in the programs “palette” and “json”. In 
the program “std”, we did not find any vulnerable inputs. This does not mean there is 
no potential vulnerable input in “std”. First, not all characters were put into the 
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vector for testing “std”. And also, the program was not tested with all possible 
combinations of characters in the vector. There is another thing needs to be noticed: 
the inputs space in the program “std” did not limit the string length, which implicitly 
increased fuzzing load, so that more resources were required to test the program. 
The three instantiations gave enough hints that large applications can be tested in 
the same way to find potential vulnerabilities. 
6.2 Issues and future work 
Yet there are still some unresolved issues that we did not concern about in the 
prototype of the grid fuzzing system, which include: 
 
First, anyone in the network connecting to the ZooKeeper can modify information in 
ZooKeeper, which makes tampering ZooKeeper possible. If attacker can connect to 
the Zookeeper or behave like the remote resource but modify code on the resource 
side, the grid fuzzing system may not get fuzzing results. In the future, ZooKeeper can 
be configured to allow access control, so that malicious requests can be rejected, 
avoiding some security issues. Yet, we have to consider balancing making use of 
more resources and security of ZooKeeper. 
 
The ZooKeeper was not configured to work in replicated mode in the thesis, which 
means that ZooKeeper’s failure would incur fatal consequence, because back-up 
servers are not available to support the fuzzing service. In the future, replicated 
mode of ZooKeeper can be configured to make the system tolerant failure. 
 
As the grid fuzzing system is developed in Ubuntu and tested in the local area 
network (LAN) environment, but not in the wide area network (WAN) environment, 
the system’s compatibility is not guaranteed. It is quite likely that resources in 
another network have problems to obtain fuzzing tasks. For addressing this issue, the 
system needs more experiment in wide area networks to find out those elements 
that affect fuzzing. By overcoming these problems, they grid fuzzing system will be 
more compatible. 
 
Additionally, in the future, we can improve the broker by fuzzing other applications 
(e.g., web applications) to exploit more types of vulnerabilities, enhancing system’s 
scalability and compatibility. Also, the broker may try to analyze the fuzzing 
feedbacks from ZooKeeper, make systematic vulnerability inspection in applications, 
and then provides security recommendations to clients. 
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